What the Economic
Survey 2025–26 Really Tells Me About Our Money, Work, and Society – Post 1/2
I read
the Economic Survey every year—but not as an economist or a policymaker. I read
it as a citizen, a taxpayer, someone who works, saves, invests, and worries
about whether India’s growth story translates into better lives.
This
year’s Survey felt different.
On the
surface, India looks exceptionally strong. Real GDP growth is expected to
exceed 7%, inflation is largely anchored, banks are well-capitalised,
corporate balance sheets have healed, and public capital expenditure is at
multi-decade highs. The Union Government closed FY25 with a fiscal deficit
of 4.8% of GDP, better than the budgeted 4.9%, and has committed to 4.4%
in FY26—a dramatic consolidation from 9.2% in FY21.
India
also received three sovereign credit rating upgrades in 2025, including S&P’s
upgrade from BBB- to BBB, the first such upgrade from a major agency in
nearly two decades.
And yet,
the Survey repeatedly lands on an uncomfortable truth: macroeconomic
success no longer guarantees currency stability, cheap capital, or protection
from global shocks.
Despite
strong growth, the rupee underperformed in 2025, foreign investors
hesitated, and gold prices surged from about USD 2,600 to over USD 5,100 per
ounce, reflecting global fragility rather than domestic panic.
So
instead of asking “How fast are we growing?”, this Survey forces a
harder question: How resilient is India’s income model, trade position,
productivity, currency, technology adoption, cost of capital—and social
contract—in a fractured world?
I’ve
organised my takeaways into seven buckets, each with implications for
the following groups:
- Corporates
- SMEs
- Working individuals
- Families and long-term
wealth
In the
end, I have added annexures with key numbers, trade-offs and watch points. Don’t
miss taking a glance at these tables.
The blog
is presented in two parts. This is the first part.
Bucket
1: Revenue Generation — Where Will India’s Income Come From?
One
thing is clear to me: India’s growth is no longer consumption-led alone.
The
Survey shows that sustained public capital expenditure, a renewed manufacturing
push, and services exports are now doing the heavy lifting. Since
2020, India’s total exports grew at ~9.4% CAGR, but merchandise
exports grew only ~6.4%, with services filling the gap.
That gap
matters.
For
corporates,
revenue growth is shifting from the “India demand story” to supply-chain
participation. The Survey is explicit: negotiated protection for upstream
industries ultimately taxes downstream competitiveness. In simple terms—tariff-protected
margins won’t last.
For
SMEs,
formalisation is no longer optional. States that reduced regulatory friction
and improved logistics saw materially higher MSME credit growth and formal
employment. Informality may reduce taxes—but it caps revenue.
For
working individuals, income
growth is increasingly driven by skill premiums rather than inflation-linked
wage drift. In practical terms, this means upgrading skills, switching roles or
sectors when needed, and not assuming annual increments alone will protect
purchasing power.
For
families and long-term wealth,
I read this as a move away from passive rent-seeking towards assets and
businesses that participate in real economic activity—manufacturing, logistics,
formal services, and export-linked enterprises—rather than relying only on
static yield or price appreciation.
Businesses
and assets tied to manufacturing ecosystems, logistics, energy, and formal
services are likely to compound faster than traditional “safe yield”
assets.
Bucket
2: Exports & Imports — Why Services Alone Won’t Save Us
This was
one of the Survey’s bluntest messages.
India
runs a persistent goods trade deficit. Services exports and remittances help,
but they are not enough to deliver durable currency stability. Every country
with a consistently strong currency—Germany, Japan, South Korea, China—is a
manufacturing export powerhouse.
India is
not there yet.
Because
manufacturing exports lag, India depends on foreign capital inflows to
balance its external account. When those flows slow—as they did in 2025—the
rupee pays the price.
Corporates should treat FTAs (especially
the EU FTA) as opportunities only if they can produce at globally
competitive cost and quality.
SMEs face a hard fork: integrate into
global value chains—through quality standards, scale, and formal compliance—or
be squeezed over time by input costs, logistics inefficiencies, and currency
volatility. Standing still is no longer a neutral option.
Working
individuals may
not track exports daily, but export-linked jobs are far more resilient
during global shocks.
Families should assume that a
structurally weaker rupee is a base case, not a temporary phase, and plan
savings and investments with this reality in mind—especially for education,
travel, imported goods, and long-term purchasing power.
Bucket
3: Risks — Productivity, People, and the Quiet Constraint
If I had
to pick the most underappreciated risk, it is productivity.
India’s
potential growth has been revised upward to 7%, from 6.5% three years
ago, driven by infrastructure and logistics. But the Survey is candid: human
capital is now the binding constraint.
Skill
mismatches, low female labour participation, health challenges, and uneven
learning outcomes quietly erode long-term growth.
Corporates can no longer rely on cheap
labour. Output per worker, not headcount, will determine margins.
SMEs increasingly cite skill
shortages as their biggest constraint. Firms investing in training show
significantly better survival and scaling outcomes.
Working
individuals
should read this clearly: income security comes from continuous skilling.
The Survey explicitly links obesity, non-communicable diseases, and digital
addiction to productivity loss.
Families often insure financial assets
but ignore human capital. That is a mistake. In a productivity-driven economy,
investments in education quality, health, and continuous skill development are
as critical to long-term family wealth as financial savings.
Bucket
4: Exchange Rate — Why the Rupee Feels Weak Despite Strong Growth
This
section resonated deeply with me.
The
rupee underperformed in 2025 not because inflation was high or growth weak,
but because global capital has become geopolitical and risk averse.
Countries running current account deficits—like India—must pay a premium.
Even Indonesia,
with the same BBB credit rating, borrows more cheaply (~6.3% vs
India’s ~6.7% on 10-year bonds), partly reflectin different external
balances.
Corporates must treat FX risk as structural
and build it into pricing, sourcing, and capital allocation decisions rather
than managing it as a temporary or tactical issue.
SMEs with thin margins are especially
exposed to currency volatility, making cost control, supplier diversification,
and basic risk awareness critical for business stability.
Working
individuals may
not feel it immediately, but currency weakness eventually affects fuel,
electronics, education, and overseas exposure—making budgeting, career choices,
and long-term savings more sensitive to global conditions than before.
Families should understand gold’s rise as
rational insurance—not sentiment—and treat it as a portfolio stabiliser against
currency, geopolitical, and financial shocks rather than as a short-term
return-seeking asset.
“In a
world that rewards resilience over speed, India must keep running the marathon
like a sprint—without tripping.”
Contd..
Post 2 will
pick up from here—by examining how technology, capital, and policy choices will
determine whether that sprint builds endurance or exhaustion.
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